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Conversions of Relief: On the perception of depth in drawings
Abstract:
Of the many ways in which depth can be intimated in drawings, perspective has undoubtedly been one 
of the most frequently examined. But there is also an equally rich history associated with other forms 
of pictorial representation. Alternatives to perspective became particularly significant in the early 
twentieth century as artists and architects, intent on throwing off the conventions of their 
predecessors, looked to new ways of depicting depth. In architecture, this tendency was exemplified 
by Modernism’s preference for parallel projection – most notably axonometric and oblique. The use 
of these techniques gave architects the opportunity to convey a new and uniquely modern form of 
spatial expression. At once shallow and yet expansive, a key feature of these drawings was their 
ability to support perceptual ambiguity. This paper will consider the philosophy and science of vision, 
out of which these preoccupations emerged. In this context, the nineteenth-century discovery of 
stereopsis and the invention of the stereoscope will be used to illustrate the way in which attempts to 
test the limits of spatial perception led to an opening up of visual experience; and provided a 
definition of visual experience that could encompass the representational ambiguities later exploited 
by the early twentieth-century avant-garde.
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That architectural drawings are often constructed almost exclusively from lines seems hardly worthy 
of comment. But the more complex concerns surrounding the representational and expressive qualities 
of drawings can sometimes serve to divert attention from the more fundamental but equally 
remarkable nature of the line itself. In architectural representation, especially today, there are, of 
course, numerous alternatives. But even in the ethereal space of the computer, lines have an enduring 
value. Some lines trace edges or contours – defining limits or clinging to surfaces. Others perform a 
less direct role by providing the projective linkages from one point or surface to another.  And 
sometimes, as is the case with the grid or datum, they are merely a frame of reference – a marker, 
against which other lines can be measured.1 Whether as illuminated points on a computer screen or as 
ink on paper, lines have colour, they have weight and sometimes they even have texture and yet at the 
same time, notionally speaking, they have no thickness at all – or they are at least, infinitely thin. 
Little wonder then that one of the primary concerns throughout the history of architectural 
representation has been how best to employ these abstract linear traces to convey three-dimensional 
depth. But whilst the abstract nature of lines might seem at first to be their most significant limitation, 
operating in the inherently ambiguous gap between the flatness of the paper or the canvas and the 
implied three-dimensionality of representation, this apparent flaw has proved to be one of the most 
important opportunities offered by drawing. 
Of the many ways in which depth can be intimated in a drawing, perspective has (at least since 
the fifteenth century) been one of the most dominant – and certainly the most talked about. But there 
is an equally rich history associated with other forms of spatial representation. Rudolf Arnheim and 
Massimo Scolari, amongst others, have, for example, pointed to the prevalence of oblique and 
‘inverted’ forms of perspective in art and architectural drawing throughout history. 2  But even in the 
explicitly two-dimensional space of orthographic drawings, devices such as occlusion, shading, and 
the tracing of shadows (sciagraphy) have often been used to bring depth to otherwise flat 
representations.
Alternatives to perspective became particularly significant in the early twentieth century as 
artists and architects intent on throwing off the conventions of their predecessors looked to alternative 
forms of pictorial representation. In architecture, this tendency is exemplified by Modernism’s 
preoccupation with parallel projection. The use of these techniques provided artists and architects, 
such as Theo van Doesburg and El Lissitzky, the opportunity to convey a new and uniquely modern 
form of spatial expression (Figs. 1, 2). An important aspect of their success lay in the perceptual 
ambiguities that these drawings were able to support.3 Concentrating predominantly on axonometric 
and oblique, , these artists were able to create representations devoid of the usual perspectival 
recession. The drawings are at once both shallow and expansive; three dimensional and yet lacking 
perspectival depth. As a result, they hover in an elusive and ambiguous space somewhere between the 
flatness of conventional orthographic drawings and the infinite extensibility offered by parallel 
projection.
 As Hilary Bryon has recently pointed out, the majority of architectural drawings made using 
parallel projection in the twentieth century were drawn with one particular form of parallel projection, 
know as oblique. 4  Oblique projection is defined, as the name suggests, by the fact that the projection 
lines run obliquely to the plane of projection. This means that one plane of the object represented can 
be aligned with the picture plane and thereby preserve some of the qualities of the two-dimensional 
drawing. It is possible that one of the reasons for twentieth-century architects’ preference for oblique 
was that it emphasised the duality that exists in this form of representation between its two-
dimensional and three-dimensional aspects: between the plan or the elevation and three-dimensional 
space. But the ambiguity which characterises these drawings is not restricted to the oblique and there 
are many examples of isometric and other forms of axonometric projection in which this quality is 
equally emphasised (Fig. 3). There are also numerous examples in which hybrid or intentionally 
inconsistent forms of representation are employed.5 
Central to this use of parallel projection is the challenge that it makes to the assumed necessary 
equivalence between perspective and human perception.  As Lissitzky describes it, the perspectival 
illusion of three-dimensional space on a plane has been ‘swept away’ by ‘the ultimate illusion of 




The world is put into a cubic box and transformed within the picture plane into something 
resembling a pyramidal form... This is a facade view of the world, where depth becomes a stage 
viewed statically... Here the apex of the visual cone has its location either in our eye, ie. in front of 
the object, or is projected to the horizon, ie. behind the object. The former approach has been 
taken by the East, the latter by the West. 7
In pointing to the reversibility of perspective, Lissitzky is also drawing attention to the fact that 
perspective is reductive. Containing only one viewpoint, the monocular view eliminates the effects of 
binocular vision and, unlike the celebration of ambiguity found in avant-garde axonometric drawings, 
ignores the limitations of human perception.8 Reversible figures and similar pictorial illusions were, 
however, at the heart of nineteenth and early twentieth research into the nature of visual space 
perception.      
Visual Depth
For many centuries philosophers and scientists have puzzled over the mysteries of visual perception. 
Even to this day, there are significant questions that remain unanswered. But since the late nineteenth 
century, psychology (and more recently neuroscience), have provided an unprecedented insight into 
the mechanisms that underpin spatial perception. 
Before the nineteenth-century, the study of space perception had been founded primarily on 
philosophical investigation, and on the optical relation between the viewer and the external world (as 
characterised by perspective). Both purely optical and perspectival accounts of vision demonstrate a 
correspondence between the relative position of objects in space and the patterns of light striking the 
retina. But these measurable parameters do little to explain how these patterns translate into sensations 
on the part of the viewer or how spatial depth might be inferred from this information. Even in the 
seventeenth century, this problem did not go unnoticed and concern both with how perceptions allows 
us to see objects in a particular position, and how the mind understands the broader spatial framework 
within which objects sit, were central to philosophical discourse on visual perception. For René 
Descartes, for example, space was a matter of extension.9 Consequently, he saw location, distance, 
size and shape as the primary concerns for vision. Incorporating the Keplerian dioptrics of the retinal 
image, his theoretical account of perception relates positions contained in the image to the perception 
of space (Fig. 5)10
Similarly, if eye D is turned toward object E, the soul will be able to know the position of this 
object, inasmuch as [in the brain] the nerves from this eye are differently arranged than if it were 
turned toward some other object. And [the soul] will be able to know the shape, inasmuch as rays 
from point I assembling on the nerve termed optic [the retina]at point 2 – and those from point 3 
at point 4, and so forth – will trace there a shape corresponding exactly to the shape of E.11
But surprisingly, despite Descartes belief in the innate capacity of the ‘soul’ to derive the extent and 
shape of the object based on the retinal image, he was not concerned with its picture-like quality. The 
visual image itself thus has relatively little status in Descartes theoretical account. Despite 
demonstrating that coherent images are formed on the back of the eye, Descartes was convinced that 
perception was not dependent on the resemblance between this image and the object:
Now although this picture, in being so transmitted into our head, always retains some resemblance 
to the objects from which it proceeds, nevertheless, as I have already shown, we must not hold that 
it is by means of this resemblance that the picture causes us to perceive the objects, as if there 
were yet other eyes in our brain with which we could apprehend it; but rather that it is the 
movements of which the picture is composed which, acting immediately on our minds inasmuch as 
it is united to our body, are so established by nature as to make it have such perceptions…12 
Descartes theory lacks some of the more detailed knowledge of physiology which would characterise 
later accounts of vision. But he does, nevertheless, concentrate on the role played by the optic nerves 
and, as suggested by the extract above, on the visual dynamic of motion parallax. He concludes that 
knowledge of position and direction with respect to the body does not depend on the image but on 
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locating the points in the brain which correspond to the nerve fibres at the back of the eye. Imaginary 
lines extending from these points provide the means by which the attention can be directed to specific 
locations. Using the analogy of a blind person searching out the position of objects in space with two 
sticks (Fig. 6), Descartes describes the convergence of the eyes as a means by which ‘as if by natural 
geometry’ we might know the location of a point. And just as an object located with two hands is not 
perceived as two objects, so the two eyes working in collaboration see a single object, despite the fact 
that a separate picture is formed in each eye. 
Established ‘by nature’ in this way and acting therefore directly on the mind, Descartes saw 
no need for the viewing subject to be aware of the parameters from which the perception was derived. 
In an equivalent manner, the size and shape of the perceived object would not be based on the 
absolute shape or size of the object as it appeared in the retinal image, but on judgments made about 
its position. Pictures, he points out, may ‘contain only oval and diamond shapes, yet they cause us to 
see circles and squares’. In summary, he concludes that it is the mind, not the eye, which is central to 
vision. But whilst appealing to some form of judgement, for Descartes this is, nevertheless, an 
immediate and natural capacity, not something that has to be learnt through experience. 13
In 1709, George Berkeley would go further to conclude that judgments about distance, (or at 
least proximity), could not be made through vision alone. Like Descartes, Berkeley, concluded that 
perception of depth relies in part on the direction and convergence of the eyes. He is also equally 
uncompromising on the question of the role played by the image formed on the retina.14 We make the 
mistake, he says, of ‘imagining that the pictures of external objects are painted on the bottom of the 
eye’. These images are understood to be a copy or representation of an original object as if looking 
with our own eyes at the images formed in the eye of another, and seeing in it a picture of a scene in 
miniature. The error here, he points out, is in assuming that the image can be compared with the 
tangible qualities of the object itself, when in fact the likeness can only be with another image. The 
image in the eye should not therefore, he concludes, be considered as a picture, but rather as itself the 
original object of vision.15 For Berkley it follows then, that distance cannot in fact be seen at all, being 
largely out of the plane of the image, or as he describes it, ‘end wise’ to the eye. He resorts instead to 
ambiguous visual cues such as the apparent size of objects and to the sensations associated with 
binocular convergence. Yet, although both Descartes and Berkeley discount the image in favour of 
convergence, Berkeley, unlike his predecessor, denies the possibility that depth can be extrapolated 
from binocular convergence via some innate geometrical sense. Our estimation of distance is, he 
suggests, informed instead by experience and knowledge of the objects we see. For Berkeley then, the 
perception of distance is not really a sense at all but rather a judgment based on relevant cues. He 
takes exception, in particular, to Descartes notion that the angle between the two optic axes provides 
the means by which the proximity of an object can be determined.16 Such lines and angles are not, he 
points out, perceived, nor do they feature in the experience. The angle between the eyes cannot 
therefore, he concludes, be responsible for introducing the idea of distance:
But those lines and angles, by means whereof some men pretend to explain the perception of 
distance, are themselves not at all perceived, nor are they in truth ever thought of by those 
unskilful in optics. I appeal to anyone’s experience whether upon sight of an object he computes its 
distance by the bigness of the angle made by the meeting of the two optic axes?17 
Descartes, of course, had not in fact suggested that a measurement of this angle was a 
conscious part of vision; simply that it was the basis for an understanding of the geometric 
relationship between the object and the observer. But Berkeley’s observation regarding the nature of 
the experience, is not, in any case central to his argument, which hinges instead on the fact that a 
geometric analysis of distance (whether consciously, or as part of some innate mechanism) is not 
actually a necessary requirement for the association of distance with convergence. If, he concludes, a 
sensation derived from the disposition of the eyes can provide information relating to their position, 
and can therefore be related to the action of directing the eyes towards an object. It should be possible 
to infer the proximity of the object directly from the sensation, without relying on any innate capacity 
for calculating distance. The inference in this case is made, not as Descartes might have described it, 
in terms of the geometry relating the position of the eyes to their distance away from the object, but 
rather as a correspondence derived solely from experience. The mind, Berkeley suggests, through 
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constant experience, finds that the sensations associated with different dispositions of the eyes can be 
related to different degrees of distance and that ‘there has grown an habitual or customary connexion 
between those two sorts of ideas.’
By the nineteenth-century experimental devices and methods, borrowed from the physical 
sciences, had begun to be employed, not simply to account for the external world, but also to 
investigate the internal mechanisms at work in the sensations that Descartes, Berkeley and others had 
described – a shift, as Jonathan Crary describes it, from the mechanics of light to the ‘physiological 
makeup’ of human sight.18 Central to this reorientation of human knowledge were studies conducted 
into the function of binocular vision.
In 1838, Sir Charles Wheatstone, then chair of Experimental Physics at King’s College 
London, delivered the first of two papers to the Royal Society in which he demonstrated an 
experimental device known as the stereoscope and with it outlined a series of experiments on 
binocular vision and the unique sense of visual depth which we now know as stereopsis.19 From the 
outset, however, the stereoscope did more than simply reveal the effects of binocular vision – it 
provided the opportunity, not only to increase the fidelity of exiting forms of representation, but also 
to challenge established explanations of spatial perception and to construct new kinds of visual 
experience.20 
Key to Wheatstone’s analysis is the gradually varying set of conditions experienced in vision 
from close proximity to the far distance: Noting that each eye must necessarily afford a slightly 
different perspective, Wheatstone considers the relative disparities that result from viewing objects at 
different distances.  When looking at objects in the far distance, he pointed out, the axes of both eyes 
will be parallel and no perceptible difference between the views from the left and the right eye will be 
observed. However, as the eyes converge on objects at closer proximity, the relative disparity between 
the two views will increase and significantly different ‘perspective projections’ will be created. 21 
Many different factors including perspective, movement parallax and focal accommodation contribute 
to our perception of visual space, but it is these small and sometimes barely detectable differences 
between the view from the left and right eye that are responsible for the vivid sense of three-
dimensionality that we know as stereoscopic vision. 
Having established that stereoscopic vision stems from the difference in viewpoint from the 
left and right eye, it became obvious to Wheatstone that it should be possible to replicate the visual 
impression of a solid object simply by simultaneously presenting suitably constructed perspectives to 
each eye: 
It being thus established that the mind perceives an object of three dimensions by means of the two 
dissimilar pictures projected by it on the two retinæ, the following question occurs: What would be 
the visual effect of simultaneously presenting to each eye, instead of the object itself, its projection 
on a plane surface as it appears to that eye? To pursue this inquiry it is necessary that means 
should be contrived to make the two pictures, which must necessarily occupy different places, fall 
on similar parts of both retinæ.22
Wheatstone’s reflecting stereoscope (Figs. 7-9), produced the desired result by virtue of a pair 
of mirrors set directly in front of the viewer. Each of these mirrors, angled at forty-five degrees, 
reflects a different image positioned on panels at either end of the device.23  On one side, he placed a 
perspective drawing constructed as if viewed from the left eye, and on the other, a drawing 
constructed as if from the right. By controlling the view of these images such that only one image is 
seen by each eye, the stereoscope therefore approximately reproduces the conditions under which a 
three-dimensional object is normally viewed. Rudimentary though this apparatus was, by presenting 
the images in this manner Wheatstone found he was able to artificially stimulate stereopsis and in the 
process create a pronounced sense of three-dimensionality in the image. As a consequence, he not 
only provided the key to a new understanding of three-dimensional visual experience but also drew 
attention to an aspect of vision that had always existed but of which, arguably, the viewing subject 
had previously been unaware.24 
Wheatstone’s analysis simultaneously places emphasis on the pictorial aspect of vision, and 
on the inadequacy of the static two-dimensional representation to capture the vivid sensation of relief 
experienced in viewing a solid object at close proximity, and with both eyes. So although 
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Wheatstone’s concern here was ultimately with the nature of binocular vision, his argument was 
nonetheless constructed in terms relating to representation and its inability to capture the vivid sense 
of relief experienced in viewing a solid object. 25 He points out, for example, that the Diorama (which 
was enjoying considerable popularity at the time)26 shows how the similar views afforded by each eye 
of a distant object can be exploited to produce a convincing depiction with a single view. Unlike the 
view of distant objects, however, when viewed at close proximity an object will present quite different 
aspects to each eye. As a consequence, it is impossible, he claims, for an artist to make a faithful 
representation of an object positioned close to the observer. 
It will now be obvious why it is impossible for the artist to give a faithful representation of any 
near solid object, that is, to produce a painting which shall not be distinguished in the mind from 
the object itself. When the painting and the object are seen with both eyes, in the case of the 
painting two similar pictures are projected on the retinæ, in the case of the solid object the 
pictures are dissimilar; there is therefore an essential difference between the impressions on the 
organs of sensation in the two cases, and consequently between the perceptions formed in the mind 
…27
But significantly for the kinds of instability associated with parallel projection, Wheatstone 
also describes the way a three-dimensional wire figure outlining a cube can be turned into an 
ambiguous figure by viewing it with one eye.28 Under these circumstances a cube may be imagined to 
be a truncated pyramid or to turn itself inside out. It is the same ‘indetermination of judgment’ which, 
he says, can cause a two-dimensional drawing to be perceived by the mind as two different figures.29 
The typical example of such figures is the so-called Necker cube. This drawing was first described by 
the Swiss crystallographer Louis Necker in 1832 and features a wireframe cube the nearest and 
furthest faces of which remain impossible to judge with any certainty. This made the Necker cube an 
important example against which Wheatstone could test his theories on depth perception. It was, 
however, his scientific rival Sir David Brewster who brought Necker’s observation to a wider 
audience when he published a letter he had received from Necker in the London and Edinburgh 
Philosophical Magazine.30 
Necker’s letter described how when examining engraved illustrations of crystalline forms a 
‘sudden and involuntary change in the apparent position of a crystal or solid’ would occur. The 
example given is, in fact, an axonometric drawing depicting some form of rectilinear crystalline block 
(Fig. 10). Studying this figure, Necker noticed that sometimes the solid would seem as if to be 
arranged in such a way that one corner presented itself as the nearest but then, moments later, his 
visual interpretation of the drawing would change so that this point seemed the furthest away. Necker 
explains this in terms of the need to bring a particular point into focus within the area of the retina 
capable of distinct vision. The point seen most clearly, he suggests, will seem closest. But, as with 
many other aspects of visual perception, debate would rage between Brewster and Wheatstone on the 
relative merits of different explanations and the role played by different aspects of vision.31 But 
perhaps most significantly for architectural representation, the spatial ambiguities contained in figures 
such as the Necker cube point the way to more complex forms of visual space in which the inherent 
contradictions between the two-dimensional representation and the implied three-dimensional form 
are made explicit. As such, the ambiguity is obviously heightened by the absence of conventional 
perspective cues. Also important here is the role played by contours and edges. In line drawings, even 
when some surfaces are evident, the absence of stereoscopic depth facilitates a certain freedom from 
the limitations of a real three-dimensional form. 
On geometric lines
Line drawings are clearly notoriously unreliable but they have nevertheless always been part of the 
way architects conceptualise buildings. This aspect of architectural drawing is suitably illustrated by 
Robin Evans in his essay, Architectural Projection.32 Evans cites a particular drawing by Bertrand the 
Elder (drawn just twenty years before Wheatstone’s ground breaking paper) in which the shadows 
cast by a Tuscan column are carefully plotted (Fig. 11). The drawing employs projective geometry to 
trace sectional slices through the column, the direction of the light and ultimately, the profiles of the 
shadows – all in precisely rendered ink lines. Evans notes how the vividly portrayed shape of the 
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shadows in drawings such as this brought out certain characteristics of classical architecture. One 
might expect that such an exercise might emphasise the solidity of the form but although technically 
precise, the results are far from stolid. The shadows, as Evans points out, challenge the static qualities 
of the structural form by superimposing a projection of the column capital onto itself. Despite the 
‘frozen sharpness of geometric delineation’, the insubstantial and transient nature of the shadow 
becomes integral to the depiction.33
The origin of drawings such as these lies in the mathematics of descriptive geometry and 
nowhere is the abstract nature of the line more evident than in its linear tracery. As a form of parallel 
projection, this kind of sciagraphy has much in common with oblique projection. And whilst in this 
case the lines (projected here in the imagined direction of the sun’s rays) are terminated by their 
intersection with another surface, as with oblique, lines extend at an angle from the orthographic view 
in order to draw out a sense of depth and sculptural form. But, like most of the geometry that had 
preceded it, descriptive geometry was nevertheless largely employed in the representation of forms 
and shapes analogous to things found in the real world. In fact it did that better than ever before – an 
effective and precise description of three-dimensional form and space that made it possible to control 
and manipulate the relations between solids and surfaces. As Robin Evans describes it, a more 
abstract and generalised version of architectural drawing – and hence supremely well suited to 
applications in stonecutting, carpentry and other forms of engineering. 34 
For some, most notably Alberto Perez-Gomez, this signifies a mathematisation of architecture 
– the triumph of function over intuition, in which design becomes a purely instrumental technological 
building science. 35 But far from grounding it in practical application, the universality and abstract 
nature of descriptive geometry would ultimately lead to a questioning of the very relation to reality 
that this functionality implies. As Evans points out, despite its application to technical problems, 
descriptive geometry was not concerned to show what things were actually like, but the relation 
between geometrically defined bodies and surfaces. The solidity of objects vaporises leaving only 
geometric outlines.36 Any notion of depth hinges on representational qualities derived from the way 
the lines are configured, and particularly, the relationships, angles and connections between them. 
And when the arrangement is inconclusive, the line’s inescapable attachment to the surface on which 
it is drawn leaves it powerless to resolve these inconsistencies.  In the service of representation, the 
subservient line is pulled and pushed around in space, dragged forward or back as required to make 
local pictorial sense. This quality is particularly in evidence in drawings constructed using 
axonometric or oblique projections. 
Jules de la Gournerie, author of one of the standard texts in descriptive geometry was typical 
in recommending that shadows should be introduced to counteract this effect.37 However, in 
Gournerie’s drawings (Figs. 12,13), as with Bertrand the Elder’s column capital, the results serve as 
much to compete with the form as to clarify it. The ambiguity contained in these figures is, it could be 
said, a direct result of the fact that we are presented with just one view. In this regard, all two-
dimensional drawings are essentially ambiguous. An obvious advantage to stereoscopic drawings is 
therefore that they can overcome such ambiguities. The parallels with geometry did not escape 
Wheatstone, and in the first of his papers on binocular vision he describes the similarity between 
descriptive geometry and binocular vision. In this science, he explains, the position of any point on a 
line is determined by its projection onto two fixed planes. In geometry, these planes are usually at 
right angles, whereas in vision they are determined by the optic axes and the notional plane occupied 
by the retinal image.38 Employed in architecture stereoscopic drawings might then have offered not 
only vivid depictions but also a key to precisely describing three-dimensional form in a manner akin 
to descriptive geometry. 
Stereoscopic Representation
As we have already seen, the mechanism through which the stereoscope conjures up a convincing 
illusion of three-dimensional form hinges on the slight differences in view that result from the lateral 
separation between the left and right eye. And it was not long before the newly invented medium of 
photography was used to record these viewpoints. Photography’s ability to accurately capture the 
irregular detail, texture and shadows found in a real scene made it ideal for this purpose. 39 And with 
the introduction of stereoscopic photography, the stereoscope quickly attained a much wider appeal. 
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Even the physicist Hermann von Helmholtz, author of the most comprehensive account of visual 
perception in the nineteenth century, could not resist effusive descriptions of its realism:
These stereoscopic photographs are so true to nature and so life-like in their portrayals of 
material things, that after viewing such a picture and recognising in it some object like a house, 
for instance, we get the impression, when we actually do see this object, that we have already seen 
it before and are more or less familiar with it. In cases of this kind, the actual view of the thing 
itself does not add anything new or more accurate to the previous apperception we got from the 
picture, so far at least as mere form relations are concerned.40 
The popularity of stereoscopic photography was clearly derived from the compelling nature of the 
effect, but its success was also, in part, the result of enhancements to the design of the viewing device 
itself. Devised by David Brewster in 1849, the lenticular stereoscope employed lenses rather than 
mirrors and was consequently a more compact and portable device (Fig. 14). As a result the new form 
of stereoscope succeeded in folding the exposed and explicit mechanism of Wheatstone’s design into 
a seemingly more natural extension of vision. 41 Given then, the pervasive nature of the stereoscopic 
image and its seemingly unsurpassed ability to represent three-dimensional experience, one might 
reasonably expect that the stereoscope would also have informed the spatial sensibilities of architects 
and artists. Indeed, David Brewster, in his book The Stereoscope: Its History, Theory and 
Construction, made a point of describing its use for the arts of painting, sculpture, and architecture.42 
In each case, his argument is primarily based on the recording and subsequent study of three-
dimensional form – replacing the need for casts or drawings from life. But, although there are 
countless stereoscopic photographs of buildings, there is no particular evidence to suggest that this 
form of photography was used creatively by architects in this period. Indeed, representational 
techniques and conventions seem to change little during the years in which the stereoscope became 
commonplace, and what few developments there are can more easily be attributed to photography as a 
whole than to the particular qualities of the stereoscopic image. 
It is important, however, to remember that in the 1830s when Wheatstone was working on 
early versions of his stereoscope, photography was still in its infancy and although the stereoscope 
was designed to explore the mechanisms and limits of natural perception, it was artificially 
constructed perspective line drawings that he employed for this task. Wheatstone himself recognised 
the potential practical application of such drawings in architecture and other disciplines: 
Stereoscopic drawings afford a means of illustrating works with figures of three dimensions, 
instead of with mere plane representations. Works on crystallography, solid geometry, spherical 
trigonometry, architecture, machinery, &c., might be thus rendered more instructive, from the 
perfect counterpart of the solid figure seen from a single point of view being represented, instead 
of merely one of its projections.43 
There are certainly examples of drawings made for the stereoscope which depict architectural 
subjects.  A stereoscopic drawing of an architectural gateway is, for example, included amongst the 
drawings made by Wheatstone (Fig. 15). This particular drawing is far from convincing, but although 
better examples can be found, the stereoscopic drawing, at least in terms of its application to 
architecture, remains problematic. 44  Significantly, drawings such as these appear in texts about 
stereoscopy, not in an architectural context, and in many cases may well have been traced or copied 
from stereoscopic photographs. The difficulty associated with producing architectural drawings in 
sufficient detail, and small enough to fit in the popular forms of stereoscope, would no doubt have 
made this approach impractical for most architects. Also, despite their stereoscopic effect, drawings of 
this kind would undoubtedly have appeared insubstantial in comparison with stereoscopic 
photographs and as a consequence would have been no match for the elaborate architectural 
perspectives produced at this time. 
Wheatstone’s drawings are, of course, also perspective projections, precisely calculated to 
simulate two slightly different viewing positions (See Fig. 9), but importantly they lack the detail and 
texture found in material objects. His drawings include projections of cubes and similar geometric 
figures; but seldom attempt to create solid forms. Instead the illusion is one of drawings that retain 
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their linear quality but yet seem as if to extend out of the paper. As a result the lines now break free 
and leap out to occupy three dimensional space. They are still lines, but they are no longer drawn on 
anything. There was obviously a certain level of expediency in these simply constructed line drawings 
but the lack of materiality was also an intentional quality.  Wheatstone was, after all, seeking to 
isolate the effects of stereopsis and eliminating other visual cues such as occlusion, texture and 
shading was therefore a necessary part of the process. 45 It is significant then that despite being about 
the tangibility of visual space the objects depicted in Wheatstone’s drawings are, in fact, the idealised 
and abstract forms of geometry. Indeed sometimes, they don’t even recognise the need to occlude the 
obscured parts of the object. They are therefore, in effect, simply the 'wire-frame' outlines of an 
entirely immaterial form. Importantly the limitations of two-dimensional representation, which 
Wheatstone sought to overcome, are most pronounced in this kind of skeletal drawing. 
Conversions of Relief
Two-dimensional figures such as the Necker cube sustain their ambiguity by virtue of the fact that all 
the lines which make up the drawing share the same visual depth. Ambiguity in two dimensions 
relies, in other words, on lack of information about the third. In theory, when binocular vision 
intervenes, the actual three-dimensional structure of the model becomes abundantly clear. Hermann 
von Helmholtz, describing the stereoscopic effect, notes how it is most conspicuous in pictures that 
show simply outlines and where there are no other cues such as shading to promote an illusion of 
three-dimensions. And although, as he admits, the vividness is greatest in stereo photographs, even 
the most complicated drawings, ‘scarcely intelligible’ without a stereoscope can in this way, he 
claims, be made perfectly clear.46 But whilst an object constructed in three-dimensions as a 
stereoscopic image will mostly preclude spatial ambiguity, in contrast to, say, a physical model, 
stereoscopic drawings combine a compelling spatial impression with all the illusory qualities of the 
line; and with this, the suggestion that some kind of ambiguity might nevertheless be attained. 
Indeed, stereoscopic photographs and drawings have an inherent ambiguity of their own. 
Stereopsis undoubtedly gives these images an enhanced sense of depth but, at the same time, the fixed 
viewpoint and close focus of the surface ensures that the stereoscopic image remains bound to its 
pictorial composition. In this sense, the stereoscopic image, as a three dimensional picture, succeeds 
in attaining a status somewhere between a solid form and a two dimensional image. Held to the spot 
by the viewpoint of the image, the experience is simultaneously three-dimensional and pictorial.47 The 
stereoscope’s capacity to unravel the usual alliance between perspective, focal accommodation and 
binocular depth therefore ensures that Wheatstone’s experiments do more than simply reinforce the 
solidity of otherwise shallow or flattened representations; they also unlocked the fixity of visual 
depth. And unlike Jules de la Gournerie, Wheatstone embraces the potential freedom from the 
limitations of conventional forms of spatial experience, prefiguring Modernism’s preoccupation with 
indeterminate representational depth. 
In the second of Wheatstone's papers on binocular vision he describes an instrument that will 
facilitate the necessary variability. A reworking of his original reflecting stereoscope, this new device 
allowed for the adjustment of both the convergence between the eyes and the focal distance at which 
the images were placed (Fig. 16). These parameters, combined with the intrinsic disparity contained in 
the drawings themselves, allowed Wheatstone to affect changes in apparent depth, and in the process 
transform depth into a malleable property. 48 
Under normal circumstances when an object moves towards the observer, the attendant 
increase in apparent size of the image would be accompanied both by adjustments in the convergence 
and focal accommodation of the eyes; and by an increasing disparity between the images. 
Wheatstone’s second stereoscope facilitated the disassociation of these measures, recombining them 
in ‘unusual manners, so that they may be associated under circumstances that never naturally occur’.49 
So, for example, as the images are swung back to reduce convergence, the depicted object will, (by 
virtue of being assumed more distant), appear to increase in relative magnitude – despite the fact that 
the retinal image remains unchanged. This fractured relationship between convergence, 
accommodation and the scale of the image is an intrinsic feature of the illusion constructed in the 
stereoscope and may go some way to explain the peculiar, artificially heightened, sense of space that 
is produced in stereoscopic images. 
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Wheatstone's dependence on mirrors also meant that he was quick to realise that stereopsis is 
easily reversible. In pursuit of what he describes as ‘conveying false perceptions to the mind’, 
Wheatstone observed that if a pair of stereoscopic images is reversed, or if each image were mirrored 
left to right, a visual space is constructed in which depth becomes inverted. In this experience, to 
which Wheatstone gives the name, ‘pseudoscopic’ space, volumes that are concave can be made to 
appear convex and those that are convex, made to appear concave. To affect this inversion, 
Wheatstone devised an instrument called the pseudoscope, which employs glass prisms to reverse the 
image seen by each eye (Fig. 17). Under these conditions, more distant objects will appear nearer and 
smaller, and nearer objects will appear more distant and larger. Equally, (provided the effects of other 
cues do not impinge on the experience), when an object is seen against a background, the foreground 
and background may become reversed. The pseudoscope, he suggests, provides a glance ‘into another 
visible world, in which external objects and our internal perceptions have no longer their habitual 
relation...’ It is also, importantly, a highly unstable illusion, stereopsis vying with other cues for 
precedence in the experience. And when, as Wheatstone reports, other external factors do interfere 
with the illusion to provide competing ideas, the two possible readings will alternate – first seeming to 
adopt one configuration and then another. 50
Central to the peculiarity of this image, is not only the pseudoscopic nature of some of its 
components but also the effects of binocular rivalry. That is, when what one sees with the right eye 
contradicts what one sees with the left. And like pseudoscopic space, binocular rivalry was also 
explored by early researchers. The experiments of, amongst others, Hermann von Helmholtz, and 
Peter Panum reveal a condition which leads to instability in the image and to some peculiar 
superimpositions, as a result of which, a dynamic patchwork of competing elements vie for 
prominence in the visual field.51 The resultant effect is an ambiguous mix of different views which 
refuse to combine – sometimes alternating between different readings and sometimes fragmenting and 
intermingling. Panum’s drawings show lines configured as if to represent a geometric figure that can 
be combined in several different ways as different parts of the figure are brought together by 
binocular vision (Fig. 18). Such experiments can be seen as part of a wider opening up of vision that 
was to facilitate a new definition of visual space in the twentieth century. 
Reversibility and the avant-garde
The possibilities presented by retinal disparity for new forms of visual space were further explored in 
1903 by scientist and philosopher Henri Poincaré. In a series of observations about the nature, content 
and optics of vision, Poincaré seeks to reveal a distinction between the conventional understanding of 
space (as defined by three-dimensional Euclidean geometry), and the sensory clues upon which 
spatial experience is based.52 In his analysis of geometry, space and vision, Poincaré points to the 
difference between the ‘pure visual space’ of the retinal image and the ‘complete visual space’ of 
three-dimensional perception. But in making this comparison, Poincaré also does more than simply 
draw attention to the conventionalised nature of geometry. He points also to the likely potential for 
exploiting the disparities that he exposes to create the conditions under which other, more complex 
kinds of space might be invoked. Of particular interest here is his observation that, unlike geometrical 
space, the space of visual experience is not isotropic, that is, it is not the same in all directions. Sight, 
Poincaré concedes, does enable us to appreciate distance and consequently to perceive three 
dimensional space. But while an appreciation of distances in all directions is obviously essential to 
forming a fully three dimensional impression, the means by which we determine distances are not, he 
suggests, equal in all directions. Distances left, right, up and down can be derived, Poincaré assumes, 
from the visual sensations produced by a two dimensional image formed on the retina. Our measure of 
proximity on the other hand appears to be different in kind. ‘Everyone knows’, he says (in terms 
reminiscent of Descartes or Berkeley) ‘that this perception of the third dimension reduces to a sense 
of the effort of accommodation which must be made, and to a sense of the convergence of the two 
eyes..’. 
The sensations associated with convergence and focal accommodation Poincaré observes 
must ordinarily work in constant relation, and as such be indistinguishable in the experience. At the 
very least, these two mechanisms appear to operate in such a highly coordinated fashion as to require 
a conscious effort for us to be aware that they exist as separate faculties.53 This fact, as a defining 
feature of our visual experience, exemplifies for Poincaré the necessary relationship between the 
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sensations we receive and the external conditions from which they are derived. And yet, intriguingly, 
as a consequence of this very consistency, Poincaré is able to progress from this observation, to 
speculate, that by altering those conditions so as to allow the two sensations to vary independently, we 
might fundamentally change the form of the space we perceive. Poincaré imagines a world 
experienced as if through a refracting medium capable of altering the parameters by which we make 
judgements about proximity and space.54 
And so in this there is also a fact of external experiment. Nothing prevents us from assuming that a 
being with a mind like ours, with the same sense-organs as ourselves, may be placed in a world in 
which light would only reach him after being passed through a refracting media of complicated 
form. The two indications which enable us to appreciate distances would cease to be connected by 
a constant relation. 55
Some years earlier, Helmholtz had also conducted experiments in which lenses and prisms were used 
to alter the nature of the image reaching the eye, and these experiments may well be the inspiration for 
Poincaré’s hypothetical scenario (Fig. 19). Significantly, however, Helmholtz’s experiments had 
demonstrated that it was possible to quickly learn to compensate for such illusions, lending weight to 
his contention that no formal similarity was required between the sensations experienced and the 
external conditions that they signify, (assuming that a consistent relation exists between the external 
cause and the sensory effect).56 Poincaré’s example, however, notionally extends these experiments to 
include an additional discontinuity between the parameters involved: a relation potentially consistent, 
not with regular space, but with a space in which focal distance and binocular disparity might vary 
independently. What it represents, of course, is a kind of inversion, in which the pattern of sensations 
in some way informs the nature of the space. But frustratingly, no detail is provided in Poincaré’s 
description, as to the exact nature of the refracting media, or of the effects it produces ― although we 
might infer that this space would exhibit an effect something like the varying scale and proximity 
described by Wheatstone as the various parameters of vision were adjusted or reversed in the 
stereoscope.
But while Wheatstone’s speculations were largely intended for a scientific audience, 
Poincaré’s writing and popular lectures were influential well beyond the scientific community and 
were regularly discussed in artistic circles.57  In this way these, and similar ideas about vision, 
continue to resonate through theories of space and representation in the early part of the twentieth-
century. Albert Gleizes and Jean Metzinger’s 1912 account of Cubism, for example, cites the effects 
of convergence and accommodation as part of their critique of perspective:
As for visual space, we know that it results from the harmony of the sensations of convergence and 
accommodation of the eye.
For the picture, a flat surface, the accommodation is negative. Therefore the convergence which 
perspective teaches us to simulate cannot evoke the idea of depth. Moreover, we know that the 
most serious infractions of the rules of perspective will by no means compromise the spatiality of a 
painting. Do not the Chinese painters evoke space, despite their strong partiality for divergence? 
58
Perhaps it was this critique of perspective that Lissitzky had in mind when he wrote about the 
reversibility of the visual cone. Inherent in their case for a dismantling of conventional perspective is 
certainly a suggestion, no doubt derived from Poincaré, that the relation between the various 
components of vision might be considered independently variable in the representational space of 
painting. And although they seem to confuse the convergence of lines in perspective with the 
convergence of the eyes in vision there is undoubtedly a relation intimated here which links the 
convergence of eyes with the increasing divergence of perspective at close proximity – a quality 
which might well be most apparent in the familiar still-life subjects of cubist painting. But in their 
promotion of divergent lines is also a suggestion of a space that extends forward of the painting and 




Certain forms must remain implicit, so that the mind of the spectator is the chosen place of their 
concrete birth. 59
No longer concerned with eliminating ambiguity but rather with celebrating the versatility of 
human perception, twentieth-century artists and architects sought new ways of appealing to the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying vision – a process that Hermann von Helmholtz describes as 
‘unconscious inference’ 60 Lissitzky, it seems, was especially interested in the ambiguities that had 
also fascinated nineteenth-century scientists. In the infinite extensibility of parallel projection he 
found a technique that released the drawing from the fixed point of view that perspective had 
necessarily entailed (Fig. 20). And in the drawings that he made for his various exhibition rooms in 
the 1920s, parallel projection provided the means to destabilise the space of the drawing both in terms 
of orientation and reversibility (Fig. 21). The agenda for drawing had clearly changed and attempts 
made by exponents of nineteenth-century engineering drawing such as Jules de la Gournerie to 
eliminate ambiguity had been replaced by a need to exploit its extraordinary qualities. 
The impetus for this shift clearly came from a desire on the part of artists and architects such 
as El Lissitzky and Theo van Doesburg to revolutionise the nature of drawing. But it was the work of 
scientists like Wheatstone that, by questioning the limits and fixity of human perception, paved the 
way for a new attitude towards the representation of depth. From Necker’s early fascination with 
ambiguous figures to Wheatstone and Panum’s interests in pseudoscopic inversions and binocular 
rivalry, it was not simply that the old conventions of perspective were no longer adequate to convey 
the newly recognised complexity of human perception. It was also that, through the alternating and 
unstable visual space of instruments such as the pseudoscope, scientists had opened a door onto a new 
visible world – a world in which conventional spatial relations could be overturned and replaced with 
a dynamic visual field of competing elements. What early twentieth century artists shared with their 
scientific predecessors was both an interest in the mechanisms that underpin pictorial representation, 
and a determination to harness its potential to create new kinds of spatial experience. Stereoscopic 
drawing may not have impacted directly on architectural representation in the nineteenth century but 
contained in Wheatstone’s stereoscopic experiments there are nevertheless clues to a very different 
kind of legacy – one that is located in the psychological dimension of visual experience and in the 
shifting ambiguities of solid and void that would be exploited by early twentieth-century avant-garde 
artists and architects.
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